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Abstract 
Stock exchanges exercise discretion when calling individual stock trading halts though the 
decision making behind the halt remains a “mystery” (WSJ, 2018). Between 2012 and 2015 halts 
are associated with large price movements (on-average 11%) and occur frequently with 97% of 
trading days having five or more halts. Given their importance, we investigate how exchanges use 
this discretion and whether the use of discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. Our findings 
suggest halts reflect the preferences of exchange constituents as opposed to simply the stated 
objectives of the exchanges (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and trades at off-equilibrium prices). 
Specifically, we find halts are less likely for (i) good news than bad, (ii) firms with opportunistic 
CEO traders, and (iii) firms with low short interests. We also find some evidence that CEO 
characteristics are associated with halt outcomes. Concerning halt effectiveness, we find the level 
of unexplained halt discretion is positively associated with both small halt returns and larger post-
halt stock return reversals, suggesting halts with more discretion are less effective.  
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1. Introduction 
Discretion by capital market participants plays a central role in the generation, dissemination, 
and efficient pricing of information. While decades of prior research examines how discretion 
affects the decisions and consequences of various market participants such as managers, analysts, 
auditors, and creditors, little is known about how discretion affects the decisions of stock 
exchanges. In contrast, the literature on exchanges focuses on the consequences of exchange 
actions without fully understanding the discretion and incentives leading to those actions.1 Stock 
exchanges exercise discretion when calling individual stock trading halts (i.e., pauses in trading to 
allow investors to digest information before committing to trades, hereafter ‘halts’) although the 
decision making behind the halt remains a “mystery” (WSJ, 2018). We investigate how exchanges 
use this discretion and whether the use of discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts.  
In order to more fully understand the consequences of halts, it is important to understand what 
discretion exchanges have and how they choose to use this discretion when calling halts. This issue 
is not unique to halts and can be seen in the evolution of other literatures.  For example, we know 
from the management forecasting literature that managers choose whether to release a 
management forecast. They also choose the timing, form, bias and precision of said forecast. It is 
difficult to determine how management guidance affects consequences (e.g., shareholder 
litigation, information asymmetry, or the cost of capital), without understanding what discretion 
mangers have and how they choose to use this discretion. We believe the use of discretion is 
especially important for halts as the FINRA and SEC guidelines do not provide explicit advice on 
when to call a halt for impending news. 
                                                          
1 An exception is Macey and O’Hara (2002), which examines listing fee and listing requirement decisions. 
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The conflicting incentives (and intense competitive environment) faced by exchanges further 
motivate our interest in understanding how exchanges exercise discretion when calling halts. First, 
exchanges and regulators contend that halts minimize excess volatility and trades at off-
equilibrium prices, thus reducing the occurrence of trades at inefficient prices.2 However, calling 
a halt (temporarily) drives liquidity to zero, which stands in direct contrast to the normal exchange 
incentive of maintaining liquid markets. Second, exchanges seek to maintain market prices that 
quickly reflect important information. However, this breaks down when information is “too 
important” or prices move “too quickly.” That is, when these circumstances occur or are 
anticipated, exchanges can (and often do) call halts to stop trading in a given stock.  
Stock exchange decisions have important implications for the manner in which information is 
impounded into price. Halts occur frequently, are associated with large price movements (e.g., 
Hopewell and Schwartz, 1978; Lee, 1992), and have been used by every major stock exchange 
around the world. Their importance appears to have increased even further in recent years. During 
our period of study (2012-2015) only one trading day has zero halts and 97% have five or more. 
Further, halt frequency almost doubles during our four year sample window and halt policies and 
procedures continue to be refined (see Moise and Flaherty, 2017, for a review). Finally, the 
absolute returns surrounding the halt are substantial, with a mean 2-trading day return of 10.9%.  
Prior to embarking on our primary research questions, we provide a test of whether exchanges 
hold considerable discretion regarding when to call halts. While the halt guidelines suggest 
exchanges hold discretion, we are unaware of any empirical evidence supporting this claim. We 
examine the use of halts by NYSE and Nasdaq to evaluate the claim. Ceteris parabis, the use of 
                                                          
2 See, for example, the SEC proposal to address extraordinary volatility in individual stocks and broader stock 
market (https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-107htm ), the SEC Plan to Address Extraordinary 
Market Volatility (https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-84-plan.pdf) or the Oversight Hearing on Market 
Circuit Breakers (https://www.banking.senate.gov/98_01hrg/012998/witness/cochrane.htm), both as of 5/8/2017. 
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halts across exchanges should be similar unless the exchanges use discretion and do so differently. 
For example, both exchanges (i) are beholden to SEC and FINRA regulations, (ii) have advanced 
notice disclosure requirements, (iii) have advanced electronic trading systems, and (iv) often 
compete for the same customers (i.e., traders and listed firms). Despite these similarities, we find 
strong evidence that exchanges implement halts differently. Specifically, Nasdaq has a greater 
propensity to call a halt than NYSE (controlling for listed firm and information characteristics) 
and this difference is concentrated in halts where exchanges have the most discretion. 
Our first research question asks how exchanges use discretion when calling halts. 
Conversations with industry insiders indicate the listing exchange benefits directly from trading 
halts by consolidating trades at the reopen rather than having the trades fragmented across other 
exchanges. We investigate the importance of this direct economic benefit by examining the post-
halt auction trading volume and conclude that incremental trading commissions are likely to be 
relatively small. Given the modest evidence of direct economic benefits, we shift to potential 
indirect economic benefits derived from constituent satisfaction. This analysis is primarily 
motivated by three observations. First, listing fees are an important source of revenue for 
exchanges highlighting the importance of retaining their listed firms (Macey and O’Hara, 2002). 
Second, the popular press has expressed concerns that exchanges have become too close to their 
listed firms (WSJ, 2018). Third, several non-US exchanges have a formal process by which listed 
firms can request a halt, suggesting that at least some exchanges explicitly call halts to cater to the 
preferences of their constituents (i.e., managers, investors, and dealers/market makers).  
Our analysis of potential constituent preferences yields four predictions. First, we predict 
exchanges are more likely to call halts for bad news than for good news. Evidence suggests that 
individuals are more sensitive to decreases in financial wealth than increases (e.g., Kahneman and 
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Tversky, 1979; Barberis et al., 2001). This asymmetry likely affects external investors as well as 
firm executives. In addition, market makers (who are important for price stability and liquidity) 
face greater inventory risk for bad news than for good due to their preference for holding positive 
positions (e.g., Comerton-Forde et al., 2010; Johnson and So, 2018). To the extent exchanges are 
responsive to market maker, investor, and/or firm preferences, they will be more sensitive to 
impending bad news than good news when making halt decisions. 
Second, we predict exchanges are less likely to call halts for firms where CEOs likely benefit 
from informed trading. Prior work suggests insiders prefer fewer constraints on their trading 
(Roulstone, 2003). To the extent CEO trading is constrained by halts and exchanges are responsive 
to the listed firm CEO preferences, we would expect a lower likelihood of halts for firms with 
informed CEO trading. We also predict CEOs engaged in liquidity trading would have similar 
preferences, albeit weaker.        
Third, we predict exchanges are more likely to call halts for firms with high short interests. 
Short sellers are generally not viewed favorably by management because they are betting on poor 
future performance. In some cases, firms actually use aggressive techniques to impede short seller 
profits (Lamont, 2012).3 Halts may be one technique in which firms could impose additional risk 
on short sellers. To the extent halts impede short sellers and exchanges are responsive to the listed 
firm preferences, we expect a greater likelihood of halts for firms with high short interests. 
Fourth, while we are unable to generate directional hypotheses, we predict that halt outcomes 
are associated with CEO characteristics. Prior research suggests managerial style and managerial 
networks are important for a wide range of corporate decisions (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Perry 
                                                          
3 As a recent example, short sellers have filed suit against Tesla claiming Elon Musk used Twitter statements as a 
“weapon against short sellers of Tesla shares.” (Kalman Isaacs vs. Elon Musk and Tesla, Case 3:18-cv-04865 
filed 8/10/18 (Northern District of California, San Francisco Division)). 
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and Peyer, 2005). Ex ante, there is no reason to expect these CEO characteristics to be correlated 
with halts unless CEOs have the ability to influence halt decisions and their characteristics lead to 
different halt preferences.  
In order to test whether our proxies capture constituent preferences as opposed to expected 
returns and volatility, we separately examine high discretion proactive halts (i.e., halts more likely 
based on judgment) and low discretion reactive halts (i.e., halts more likely mechanical in nature). 
We view the evidence to be strongest when a proxy is significantly related to proactive halts and 
the coefficient using proactive halts is significantly greater (in absolute terms) than the related 
coefficient using reactive halts. 
Consistent with exchanges catering to constituent preferences, we find bad news is more likely 
to result in a halt than good news, controlling for the magnitude of the news. Further, we find halts 
are less likely for firms with opportunistic CEO traders, less likely for firms with CEOs engaged 
in routine trading, and more likely for firms with high short interests. We also find some evidence 
that CEO characteristics are associated with halt outcomes. Collectively, this evidence suggests 
exchanges cater to their various constituents when deciding whether to call a halt. 
Our second research question asks whether the use of discretion by exchanges is associated 
with halt effectiveness. Evaluating the consequences of halts is complicated by the need to generate 
a defensible counterfactual. Noting this challenge, we propose two tests that we believe are less 
subject to counterfactual concerns. Specifically, we examine the association between halt 
discretion (i.e., halts less explained by expected returns and volatility) and two market 
consequences that are inconsistent with an effective halt.  We test for halt ineffectiveness using  (i) 
the likelihood of a small halt return (i.e., an unnecessary halt or a “miss”); and (ii) stock return 
reversals after the halt. We find the level of unexplained halt discretion is positively associated 
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with both small halt returns and larger stock return reversals after the halt, suggesting halts with 
more discretion are less effective. 
The tests we present use a broad sample of firm-quarters by identifying whether a given firm-
quarter contains a trading halt. This approach allow us to clearly define both halt and non-halt 
observations while preserving a large sample. However, this approach does not identify the 
specific information events underlying the halts. As a result, we repeat our tests on one particular 
type of material information release (8-K filings) and report these results in an Internet Appendix. 
This approach links halts to one source of material information at the cost of sample size and 
generalizability. The results are highly consistent with those reported for the firm-quarter sample.  
Our study is not only important to academics, but also to policy makers, regulators, and 
investors for two primary reasons. First, we show halt decisions reflect the preferences of exchange 
constituents as opposed to simply the stated objectives of the exchanges (i.e., minimizing excess 
volatility and trades at off-equilibrium prices). Rather than halting to obtain direct economic 
benefits, our results are consistent with critiques in popular press that “exchanges have become 
beholden to the companies they list” (WSJ, 2018). Second, we show that halts are less effective 
when unexplained discretion is high, which is especially important given the ongoing regulatory 
debates about the optimal use of halts.     
We believe halts provide a fruitful setting for future research. For example, our study highlights 
two seemingly opposing trends that could be reconciled. Specifically, it appears exchanges are 
increasing the use of intraday proactive halts (that occur in advance of significant impending 
news), which contrasts the general trend of shifting disclosure of material news outside of market 
hours (e.g., earnings announcements). Halts also provide a unique setting that can enhance our 
understanding of information transfers as the subject firm is halted but peer firms typically are not. 
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In addition, studies interested in investigating intraday price responses to news could use halts to 
identify major news events. 
Future research may also benefit by partitioning halts into those that are proactive (i.e., based 
on anticipated news and price movement) or reactive (e.g., triggered by rules that respond to 
information already in the public domain). We provide a method to identify these halt types that 
can be used across exchanges. Our validation tests confirm that proactive halts have considerable 
discretion while reactive halts do not. 
2. Halts and exchanges 
2.1 Individual stock trading halts 
The key regulatory body overseeing the U.S. financial markets is the SEC. Its mission is to 
“protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”4 
To achieve this, the SEC institutes regulations that govern the securities industry. While the SEC 
is the ultimate authority, during our period of study (2012-2015), the SEC relied heavily on 
recommendations provided by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA, an 
independent organization overseen by the SEC, regulates U.S. stock markets.  
The SEC and FINRA provide guidance that influences the timing and prevalence of halts, 
however actual implementation is in the hands of the exchanges. In particular, both NYSE and 
Nasdaq employ a MarketWatch group to monitor market activity and oversee the disclosure 
requirements of listed-firms. MarketWatch determines whether news notifications from listed 
firms are material, monitors newswires, evaluates market activity, and communicates with listed 
                                                          
4 As part of this objective, “…the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other 
information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for 
themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through the steady flow of timely, 
comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions. The result of this 
information flow is a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation 
so important to our nation's economy.” Per https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html as of 4/4/2017. 
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firms to ascertain if a halt is warranted (for ease of notation, we refer to MarketWatch as the 
exchange hereafter).5 We next discuss the various halt types used on NYSE and Nasdaq based on 
several sources from the key regulatory bodies including the SEC, FINRA, and the exchanges.6  
The first type of individual stock halt, a news halt (sometimes referred to as a regulatory halt), 
is proactively declared by exchanges in anticipation of a material news release.7 When a halt of 
this type is imposed by the primary listing exchange, the halt must be honored on all other U.S. 
exchanges on which the security trades (including the options market). Helping to facilitate the 
decision of whether or not to proactively call a news halt, stock exchanges have their own 
disclosure guidelines that are more stringent than the SEC’s.8 These guidelines require that the 
listed firms notify the Exchange at least 10 minutes in advance of news releases occurring shortly 
before or during market hours.9 This advance notice allows the exchange to determine whether the 
stock should be halted. While the disclosure rules provide examples of material types of 
information, news halts are called at the full discretion of the exchange.  
The second type of halt is reactively declared by stock exchanges based on price limits and is 
also honored on all other markets. We refer to these halts as price limit halts, though they are 
sometimes referred to as single-stock trading pauses, single-stock circuit breakers, or security-
level price limits.10 Leading up to the sample window, individual stock price limits were as 
                                                          
5 Per Nasdaq MarketWatch description (https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=MarketWatch ); NYSE 
memo on Listed Company Guidance dated January 12, 2015 
(https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse/2015_NYSE_Listed_Company_Compliance_Guidance_
Memo_for_Domestic_Companies.pdf); and NYSE Timely Alert Reminder dated November 18, 2014 
(https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse/timelyalertmemo.pdf ), all as of 5/4/2017. 
6 See https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerstradinghalthtm.html (as of 4/5/2017), 
http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/when-trading-stops-halts-suspensions-other-interruptions (as of 4/5/2017), 
NYSE Listed Company Manual, and Nasdaq Equity Rules.  
7 While we do not have documentation of when these halts were initiated, they have been in use by the exchanges 
since at least the mid-1970’s as documented in Hopewell and Schwartz (1978). 
8 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Sections 201 and 202 and Nasdaq Equity Rules Section 5250. 
9 The NYSE requirement was amended towards the end of the sample window on Sept 2, 2015, to extend the 
disclosure window to begin at 7:00am (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2015/34-75809.pdf ) 
10 Single stock price limits were initially implemented following the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010. 
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follows: a 10% price movement within five minutes for S&P 500 and Russell 1000 Index firms, 
30% for stocks priced at $1.00 or greater, and 50% for stocks below $1.00. The SEC made minor 
changes to the price limits via the Limit Up/Limit Down (LULD) guidelines that were approved 
on May 31, 2012 and were phased in beginning on April 8, 2013. While the old rules triggered 
halts given a price shift, the new rules require the use of pricing bands around a calculated reference 
price (the average traded price over the prior five minutes).11 These rules are designed to reduce 
occurrences of extraordinary market volatility and reduce the number of halts resulting from errors 
(FINRA 13-12). That being said, prior studies argue that these changes were relatively minor.12    
The third type of halt is only used by NYSE and is due to perceived order imbalance.13 These 
order imbalance halts (sometimes called pseudo-halts) are distinct and prior research argues that 
these are not actually halts because trading still occurs on other markets (Chakrabarty, Corwin, 
and Panayides, 2011). Based on this logic, we exclude from the sample any halts with trading on 
other exchanges during the halt window. 
2.2 Prior literature on trading halts 
Prior research focuses on the consequences of halts with three primary findings. First, halts 
occur frequently and are associated with substantial shifts in equilibrium prices (e.g., Hopewell 
and Schwartz, 1978; Lee, 1992). Second, information transmission during halts promotes the price 
                                                          
11 The pricing bands are set a certain percent away from the reference price, depending upon the security (i.e., in the 
S&P 500 or Russell 1000 Index) and the reference price. Initially, and similar to prior guidelines, the pricing 
bands only apply from 9:45a.m. to 3:35p.m. The bands were subsequently extended to the first 15 minutes and last 
25 minutes, with doubled pricing band parameters to accommodate the increased volatility. The stock enters a 
“limit state” for 15 seconds if one side of the market exceeds the limit band and the other side reaches the band 
(e.g., the national best bid (NBB) is below the lower band and the national best offer (NBO) is equal to the lower 
band or vice versa). If the quoted prices do not revert back into the allowable band range within 15 seconds, the 
exchange declares a 5-minute trading pause. 
12 Brogaard and Roshak (2016) note that “the limit up-limit down rules are only slightly different from the [prior] 
rules” and Moise and Flaherty (2017) note that “[t]he price limits referenced in the academic literature are similar 
in nature to the price bands introduced by the [limit up-limit down] rules” and that these new rules are simply “a 
more finely calibrated mechanism.” 
13 Similar to news halts, we do not know when order imbalance halts were initiated on NYSE, however, we do know 
they have been in use on NYSE since at least the mid-1970’s as documented in Hopewell and Schwartz (1978). 
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discovery process (Kim and Yang, 2004). For example, Corwin and Lipson (2000) document that 
investors adjust their positions by increasing market or limit order submissions and cancelations 
during the halt, leading to significant price discovery. Further, specialist indicator quotes during 
the halt are consistent with a progressive price discovery process (Schwartz 1982; King et al., 
1992) and the re-opening prices are a good predictor of future prices (Corwin and Lipson, 2000). 
Third, trading volume and volatility following halts are higher than normal levels (Lee et al., 1994; 
Christie et al., 2002).  
Concurrent studies continue to investigate the consequences of halts, specifically related to 
price limits. For example, Hautsch and Horvath (2017) document that price limits break local price 
trends, lead liquidity providers to revise positions, enhance price discovery, and accelerate 
volatility and bid-ask spreads. Meanwhile, Brogaard and Roshak (2016) document that price limits 
reduce the frequency and severity of extreme price movements, but induce price under-reaction. 
Finally, an SEC white paper provide descriptive evidence on the frequency of trading pauses and 
erroneous trades under the LULD regulations (Moise and Flaherty, 2017). 
2.3 Sample selection and descriptive evidence on halts 
Table 1 provides the details of our halt sample selection. Panel A starts with all halts identified 
in the TAQ quote files from 2012 to 2015 to identify instances of halts on NYSE, Nasdaq, and 
AMEX. Consistent with prior literature, we identify halts in the TAQ quote files by searching for 
non-standard condition codes (e.g., Christie et al., 2002).14 This yields a four year sample of 27,787 
halts. We then restrict the sample to observations appropriate for testing our empirical predictions. 
First, we remove halts related to exchange-wide shutdowns, as these are not relevant for our 
                                                          
14 Specifically, we search for quotes where the condition code is in (“D”, “P”, “I”, or “M”) and the bid and offer 
prices are zero. Next, we also search for quotes where the condition code is equal to “N”, but do not require the 
bid and offer prices to be zero, as these observations also have the characteristics of trading halts.  
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research questions. Second, we merge the resulting sample with CRSP and Compustat and 
eliminate securities other than common stock (e.g., exchange-traded funds). Third, we also 
eliminate ‘halts’ where trading occurred on other exchanges, as Chakrabarty et al. (2011) 
document that these non-regulatory (primarily order-imbalance) halts have different trading 
environment characteristics than true halts. Finally, we retain one halt per firm per day (i.e., when 
there are multiple halts in a given day, we keep the first for which there are five minutes of prices 
preceding the halt) and remove the halts related to AMEX. This yields a sample of 7,914 halts for 
2,391 unique firms.  
In Panel B, we provide descriptive statistics on the halt sample. We begin by providing details 
on the duration of the halt in minutes. The interquartile range is 31 minutes, increasing from 5 
minutes at the first quartile to 36 minutes at the third quartile. The mean duration is substantially 
longer, however, at 101 minutes. This reflects the presence of extremely long halts, or those that 
do not resume within the trading day.15 Next, we provide details on the information associated 
with the halts. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1998), we show that 
halts are associated with large price changes on average. Specifically, the average absolute two-
trading day return (beginning at the prior market close) is greater than 10%. The sample is also 
evenly distributed between good and bad news halts (according to these same returns). 
In the second portion of Panel B, we provide descriptive statistics on the intraday returns (based 
on the mid-point of the bid-ask spread) immediately surrounding the halt.16 On average, we show 
an absolute return of 6.3% in the 10-minute window preceding the halt, 6.6% during the halt, and 
4.0% in the 10-minute window following the halt. 
                                                          
15 We code halts that do not resume during the trading day with a resumption time of 11:59 p.m. 
16 We omit halt observations that do not have regular quote information in TAQ from 10-minutes prior to 10-minutes 
after the halt. We also omit observations where the bid-ask spread exceeds 100 percent of the midpoint. 
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Figure 1 provides evidence that halts are frequent events on the major U.S. exchanges during 
the sample period (2012 to 2015). Consistent with prior literature, we find halts are common on 
U.S. exchanges. For the population of halts (Panel A), we find virtually all trading days have at 
least one halt and 97% have five or more. The mean for a given day is 17.6 halts. After removing 
halts that do not meet the sample requirements (Panel B), we find that the most common 
occurrence in the sample is 4 halts in a day (which occurred on 85 trading days in the sample).  
Figure 2 provides additional details on the prevalence of halts through time. Specifically, it 
shows the percent of firms-quarters associated with a halt during the sample period. The percent 
of firms experiencing a halt approximately doubles during our sample, increasing from 4.6% of 
firms in the fourth quarter of 2012 to 9.2% of firms in the fourth quarter of 2015. Interestingly, 
Figure 2 also provides descriptive evidence that halts appear to be more common in the fourth 
quarter of the calendar year.17 
Figure 3, Panel A provides plots of the cumulative 30-second returns (based on the mid-point 
of bid-ask spreads) from 10-minutes prior to the halt to 10-minutes after the halt. We partition halts 
on good and bad news according to the total return across this interval. The dashed portion of each 
line represents the change in price during the halt (time 0). Each of the lines displays a large price 
change during the halt. Interestingly, the lines display at least some drift following the halt 
(particularly in the first 30 seconds following the halt). The mean magnitude of return around the 
halt is larger for good news (11%) than for bad news (8%). 
Collectively, the halt literature and our descriptive evidence suggests that halts are a 
particularly important subset of events that occur frequently and play a key role in the evolution 
                                                          
17 In untabulated analyses we examine the halt trends separately for firms with December fiscal year ends and non-
December fiscal year ends. Results suggest that the documented trend is a calendar fourth quarter effect, rather 
than a fiscal fourth quarter effect.  
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of prices. In the following sections, we investigate how discretion is applied to the halt decision 
and whether it has implications for the effectiveness of halts.     
2.4 Settings 
We use a broad sample of firm-quarters from 2012-2015, where each firm-quarter is defined 
as a halt observation if at least one halt event occurs for that firm during that quarter. All other 
firm-quarters are non-halt observations. Table 2 provides details on sample selection that we use 
to investigate our research questions. The sample begins with all 109,939 firm quarter observations 
on CRSP. We then apply similar filters to those used for the halt sample (merge with Compustat, 
drop ETFs, drop AMEX observations) and require market value of equity to be non-missing at the 
end of the prior quarter. These filters result in a firm-quarter sample of 66,460 observations (5,413 
firms). Finally, we merge the resulting sample with the halt sample from above to identify firm-
quarters with an associated halt, finding 3,764 firm-quarters with at least one halt.  
Using this broad sample maximizes the sample size and generalizability of our findings.  
However, it limits our ability to evaluate how halts are related to specific information events. In 
light of this limitation, we perform the same analyses using a second sample based on 8-K filings 
with the SEC during the same four-year window. As halts are the result of material information 
(actual or rumor-based) and the SEC requires firms to file 8-Ks to “announce major events,” we 
examine when 8-Ks are associated with halts.18,19 While this sample provides us with greater 
insights into the association between halts and the underlying information events, we realize 8-Ks 
are only one source of material information such that the results may not generalize.  Nevertheless, 
                                                          
18 See https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html as of 4/13/2017. 
19 While it is possible to get a precise time on when 8-Ks are accepted by the SEC, this timestamp does not reflect 
precisely when the 8-K became publicly available (Rogers, Skinner, and Zechman 2017). Furthermore, there is no 
requirement that the 8-K release is the first time that the information became public.  
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we provide the results from the 8-K sample in the Internet Appendix.  As shown there, our central 
findings are robust to using this alternative sample. 
3. Exchanges and discretion 
3.1 Evaluating the claim 
To evaluate the claim that exchanges have discretion, we examine whether NYSE and Nasdaq 
make different halt decisions (holding listing firm characteristics and information content 
constant). Unless the exchanges use discretion, and do so differently, the likelihood of calling halts 
should be similar (after controlling for differences in expected returns and volatility). Specifically, 
the disclosure requirements and trading pause guidelines at each exchange arise from common 
SEC and FINRA regulations. Further, both exchanges have similar, albeit not identical, market 
structures (e.g., electronic trading systems, listing requirements) and objectives (e.g., to attract 
listing firms, earn trading commissions, and reduce extraordinary volatility) as well as disclosure 
regulations for listed firms.20  
If we find a difference in halt across exchanges, it is consistent with the exchanges using 
discretion in calling halts. In contrast, not finding a difference would be consistent with either a 
lack of discretion or both exchanges choosing to use their discretion in a similar manner.     
3.2 Where the discretion lies (proactive/reactive) 
We expect the discretion to be greater for some halt types than others. Specifically, we expect 
these relations to be stronger when trading halts are proactively declared in anticipation of a 
material news release as opposed to reactively triggered by mechanical rules. Ideally, we would 
                                                          
20 Prior literature acknowledges that NYSE market-making specialists differ from Nasdaq market makers. While this 
was an important difference historically, our understanding is that most of the market-making differences were 
minimized with NYSE’s transition to a hybrid market. NYSE continues to contend that Designated Market 
Makers are a differentiating factor. Our discussions with industry specialists suggest this difference is unlikely to 
be substantial. 
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split the sample between those halts that are mechanical (and therefore contain little if any 
discretion)21 and those that are based on judgment. Unfortunately, the data to disentangle these 
types of observations is not readily available.  
One method to bifurcate the sample based on discretion is to use the TAQ condition codes 
(e.g., “D” and “P” to capture discretionary news based halts versus “M” to primarily capture price 
limit or mechanical halts). However, these classifications are only available for NYSE halts; all 
Nasdaq halts are coded the same (“N”) regardless of the underlying motivation. A second method 
to classify halts based on discretion is to (attempt to) replicate the mechanical halt rules. 
Unfortunately, the price limit halts (e.g., halts arising from the price limit and LULD rules) are 
very technical in nature and have evolved during the sample period (e.g., to date the LULD rules 
have gone through 12 amendments). Furthermore, the data (e.g., price bands) to precisely identify 
these halt types is not available for the sample period.  
As a result of these difficulties, we devise a procedure to separate those halts that are more 
likely to contain discretion (proactive) from those that are less likely (reactive). Our algorithm 
reflects the spirit of the LULD rules. Conceptually, for each of the halts in the sample with 
sufficient stock return data, we classify the halt as proactive or reactive depending on whether 
there is a large absolute stock return in the five minutes prior to the halt (reactive) or not 
(proactive). This entails a small loss of sample resulting in 6,496 halts classified. We code 
instances where the absolute value of the five-minute stock return (as calculated via midpoints of 
the bid-ask spread) prior to the halt is greater than or equal to five percent as reactive and instances 
where the return is less than five percent as proactive.  
                                                          
21 The mechanical halts stem from the LULD rules. While these rules are almost entirely mechanical in nature, they 
do allow for a minor amount of discretion. For example, the rules allow for, but do not require, a primary listing 
exchanges to declare a halt when a stock is in a “Straddle State” (i.e., when one quote is outside the price bands 
and the stock is not in a limit state). See SEC Release No. 34-67091.  
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In Table 3 we provide a summary of our halt classification scheme across the various quote 
condition codes. To the extent our classification of proactive and reactive reflects variation in 
discretion, we expect news dissemination (“D”) and news pending (“P”) to be predominantly 
coded as “proactive” in our classification scheme. In contrast, we expect additional information 
(“M”) to be coded as “reactive” as this quote condition appears to be primarily reserved for price 
limit halts. We do not have any expectations regarding the order imbalance (“I”) halts (aka pseudo-
halts). Consistent with expectations, we find that 92% of the classifiable news disseminated and 
news pending halts are coded as proactive, whereas 84% of the additional information (“M”) halts 
are coded as reactive. Overall, these results suggest that our proactive and reactive classifications 
are reasonable (albeit imperfect) proxies for more and less discretionary halts, respectively.  
3.3. Descriptive evidence on proactive and reactive halts 
Similar to the descriptive evidence for the total population, we provide time trends and return 
plots for proactive and reactive halts separately. In Panel B of Figure 2 we present the time trend 
of proactive and reactive halts. Both proactive and reactive halts exhibit an upward trend. For 
example, the percent of firms encountering a proactive (reactive) halt increased from 2.0% (0.9%) 
to 5.2% (4.8%) from 2012 to 2015. In Panel B of Figure 3 we provide return plots for proactive 
and reactive halts separately to illustrate our classification scheme. By construction, a large (small) 
portion of the cumulative return occurs before the halt for reactive (proactive) halts. Specifically, 
almost 85% of the average cumulative return for good news reactive halts occurs before the halt 
begins, whereas only 15% occurs before good news proactive halts. We find consistent trends for 
bad news halts, with approximately 75% (7%) of the average cumulative return for bad news 
reactive (proactive) halts occurs before the halt begins. 
17 
 
3.4. Evidence on exchange discretion 
We test whether NYSE and Nasdaq have different propensities to halt trading in Table 4. The 
univariate results in Panel A document that NYSE observations (NYSE) represent 43% of the no-
halt sample but only 21% of the halt sample, suggesting Nasdaq has a greater propensity to call 
halts. We also compare our control variables (for expected returns and volatility) across the halt 
and no-halt samples. The controls include variables measured at the end of the prior firm quarter: 
firm size (LnMVE), trading volume (Volume), stock price volatility (Volatility), analyst coverage 
(LnNumAnalysts), and percent institutional ownership (InstOwn). The controls also include 
variables measured for the current quarter: absolute value of the most extreme daily return in the 
quarter (AbsExtremeRet), absolute value of returns (AbsQtrRet), the number of 8-K filings 
(LnNum8Ks), and whether the firm issued a management forecast (MgmtFcst). As expected, each 
of these variables is significantly different across the two samples. 
Panel B shows all variables differ significantly between the NYSE and Nasdaq samples. Of 
primary interest, Nasdaq stocks are 2.8 times more likely to be halted than NYSE stocks (7.77% 
of firm quarters versus 2.78%). As expected, the NYSE sample contains larger firms with more 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage. NYSE firms also have more volume of stock traded 
and a less volatile stock price. The NYSE firm-quarters have lower absolute quarterly returns, 
lower absolute extreme daily returns, fewer 8-Ks filed with the SEC, and are more likely to have 
issued management forecasts. We use multivariate tests and entropy balancing in the next panel to 
control for these key differences.    
Panel C provides our formal tests of whether the exchanges differ in their use of halts. In 
Column 1, we regress halts on NYSE and the controls for expected returns and volatility, and find 
that Nasdaq has a greater propensity to call a halt than NYSE.  
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While including linear controls helps minimize the correlated omitted variable problem 
resulting from firm differences, they may not be adequate. As a result, we use an alternative 
approach in Column 2 to obtain covariate balance across the NYSE and Nasdaq samples. 
Specifically, we use entropy balancing to re-weight the Nasdaq sample such that the control 
variables and fixed effects in Column 1 are indistinguishable between the NYSE and Nasdaq 
samples across three moments (mean, variance and skewness). After entropy-balancing, we 
continue to find a negative marginal effect on NYSE (1.31%, p-value < 0.01), which is both 
economically and statistically significant. This 1.31% difference implies that moving from NYSE 
to Nasdaq leads to an increase in probability of a halt from 2.78% (the NYSE sample probability 
in Panel B) to 4.09% (the probability of a Nasdaq halt after entropy-balanced re-weighting, equal 
to 2.78% + 1.31%), which is a 47% greater probability of a halt. 
To the extent that the differential halting behavior across exchanges is driven by discretion, we 
expect the prior results to be concentrated in proactive halts. We expect minimal, if any, difference 
across exchanges in reactive halts where discretion should be low, with large differences 
suggesting either the entropy balancing was ineffective or the measurement error in the 
proactive/reactive bifurcation is severe. In Columns 3 and 4, we find the variation in halt decisions 
across exchanges is present for proactive halts but not for reactive halts. Furthermore, the 
differences across the proactive and reactive specifications are significant (p-values < 0.01). These 
results are consistent with entropy balancing successfully controlling for differences between listed 
firms on NYSE and Nasdaq. Collectively, the evidence indicates that exchanges have discretion 
when calling halts and that NYSE and Nasdaq use their discretion differently.  
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 4. Research Question 1: How do exchanges use discretion? 
In order to enhance our understanding of incentives surrounding halts, we interviewed five 
industry insiders with differing areas of expertise and representing various constituencies.22 These 
conversations indicated that exchanges may use a number of methods to maximize value within 
the constraints of FINRA and SEC guidelines and regulations. Specifically, not only do exchanges 
take actions to provide direct economic benefits but also may take actions providing indirect 
benefits by catering to their constituents (e.g., listed firms).  
4.1. Direct economic benefit analysis: consolidation of trades 
One potential direct economic benefit of halts to the listing exchange is the consolidation of 
trades. Order flow during regular trading periods is fragmented across 15 different exchange codes 
included in the TAQ database. However, after a trading halt, the listing exchange hosts a re-
opening auction and receives all of the corresponding commissions (i.e., trading at the auction is 
not fragmented, but consolidated at the listing exchange).  
In untabulated analysis, we find that $324,600 is traded per halt, on average, in the reopening 
auction. To gauge the economic significance of this value we provide a rough proxy for the trading 
volume “lost” during the halt. Specifically, for each halt we accumulate the volume leading up to 
the halt over a window equivalent to the halt length. On average, the pre-halt window volume is 
$4,519,940, of which $2,382,320 (53%) occurs on the listing exchange. Compared to these figures 
the $324,600 does not seem economically large, raising doubts that consolidating trading 
commissions is a first order incentive. 
                                                          
22 In addition, we read (with the help of doctoral and undergraduate students) all 42 of the comment letters submitted 
to the SEC for the recent LULD rules and amendments (Comment letters from https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
631/4-631.shtml (as of 12/2/2017). Overall, the letters were strongly in favor of the LULD rules and only argued 
for minor adjustments (e.g., date of implementation and whether halts should be permitted around market open 
and close). None of these parties expressed a desire to eliminate halts, but this may not have been the best forum 
for that debate. Given the minor nature of the suggestions, these letters did not yield economically meaningful 
cross-sectional predictions. 
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4.2. Indirect economic benefit analysis: predictions 
 One potential indirect economic benefit of halts to the listing exchange is increasing the 
satisfaction of constituents (e.g., investors, market makers, and/or firms).  There are several 
reasons why exchanges may view increasing the satisfaction of constituents as a benefit. First, 
listing fees are an important source of revenue for exchanges highlighting the importance of 
retaining their listed firms.23 Second, according to the Wall Street Journal, “critics contend the 
exchanges have become beholden to the companies they list” (WSJ, 2018). Third, several non-US 
exchanges have a formal process by which listed firms can request a halt, suggesting that at least 
some exchanges call halts based on the preferences of their constituents (i.e., managers, investors, 
and dealers/market makers).24 To the extent exchanges seek constituent satisfaction, the exchange 
may cater to their preferences. We make four predictions where we expect constituents to have 
preferences regarding halts. 
4.2.1 News direction 
We begin by examining the information underlying halts. Absent discretion on the part of the 
exchanges, there is no obvious reason to anticipate the direction of news to influence the likelihood 
of a halt, after controlling for the magnitude of the news. The guidance provided by regulators, 
price limit halt rules, and disclosure requirements for listed firms are all symmetric and do not 
differentiate between good news and bad news.25  
                                                          
23 For example, Macey and O’Hara (2002) document that listing fees make up 40% of NYSE revenue. 
24 For example, the Sydney Stock Exchange Listing Rules indicate the exchange may “grant a trading halt at the 
written request of a listee” and the FAQs provided by the Shanghai Stock Exchange describe halts as “a basic 
right entitled to listed companies.”  
25 As an example of the regulatory guidance, FINRA explicitly notes that “the more likely the announcement is to 
affect stock price, whether positively or negatively, the more likely the exchange is to call for a trading halt…” 
(emphasis added). See http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/when-trading-stops-halts-suspensions-other-
interruptions as of 5/8/2017. As an example of the disclosure requirements, the NYSE Manual, Section 202.06 
explicitly states that “[u]nfavorable news should be reported as promptly and candidly as favorable news.” 
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However, to the extent that exchanges are influenced by constituent preferences, there are 
several reasons why exchanges would be more likely to call halts for bad news than good. First, 
there is substantial evidence in the behavioral finance literature that individuals are more sensitive 
to reductions in financial wealth than increases, often referred to as loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Gertner, 1993; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001). 
This asymmetry likely affects not only external investors but also firm executives. 
Second, market makers (important for exchange price stability and liquidity) tend to be more 
sensitive to bad news than to good news surprises. Market makers provide liquidity by serving as 
the trade counterparty in response to imbalanced demand and are often forced to take temporary 
positions that expose them to price fluctuations (Johnson and So, 2018). Despite the fact that 
market makers take actions to reduce their exposure to inventory risk (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2002; Nagel, 2012; and So and Wang, 2014), they generally hold positive 
positions (e.g., Camerton-Forde et al., 2010; Johnson and So, 2018).26 Because bad news events 
would likely exacerbate market makers’ exposure to downside inventory risk, they may be more 
sensitive to (and therefore prefer halts for) bad news relative to good news. We proxy for news 
direction using an indicator (GoodNewsIndicator) equal to one if the most extreme daily return in 
the quarter (i.e., the day most likely to have a halt) is positive. 
4.2.2 CEO trading behavior 
CEOs have private information about the historic performance and future prospects of their 
firm. Due to this information advantage, insiders frequently earn excess returns on their trades 
(e.g., Seyhun 1986). These excess returns often relate to important information events, and insiders 
prefer fewer constraints on their trading around these events. Consistent with this logic, Roulstone 
                                                          
26 In fact, Camerton-Forde et al. (2010) document that market makers hold net positive inventories 94% of the time.  
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(2003) argues that insiders, whose trading is restricted around earnings announcements (due to 
blackout policies), demand higher compensation to offset the lost trading profits from constrained 
trading. To the extent CEO trading is constrained by halts, we predict firms with information-
based CEO trading prefer fewer halts. We also predict firms with CEOs engaged in liquidity 
trading would have similar, albeit weaker, preferences.  
The above arguments are based on the assumption that CEOs prefer fewer constraints on their 
trading. If CEOs are not inclined to trade around information events, we would expect this 
constraint to be less important. While we cannot observe whether CEOs want to trade during a 
halt, we can observe CEOs’ actual trading around halts when markets were open. Figure 4 shows 
the distribution of CEO trades around halts. Because Bettis et al. (2000) document that most firms 
have blackout periods surrounding earnings announcements, we examine halts associated with 
earnings announcements separately. Panel A documents a significant spike in CEO trades on the 
day of the halt suggesting that informed CEOs want to trade around the underlying information 
event.  Alternatively, Panel B shows a substantial delay in CEO trading for the subsample 
associated with earnings announcements, consistent with blackout period restrictions. These 
patterns hold for both reactive and proactive halts, but are significantly more pronounced for 
proactive. Collectively, this evidence shows CEOs trade around halt events suggesting that halts 
may be a costly constraint to CEO trading. We use two proxies to capture CEO trading behavior. 
Following Cohen et al (2012), we include indicators for whether the CEO is an opportunistic trader 
(CEOOpportunisticTrader) or a routine trader (CEORoutineTrader).  
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4.2.3 Short Interest 
Short sellers are known to be informed traders,27 but this type of trading is quite risky 
(Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2017). Given short sellers are betting on poor future 
performance, they are generally not viewed favorably by firm management. In some cases, firms 
actually use aggressive techniques “to impede short selling, including legal threats, investigations, 
lawsuits, and various technical actions intended to create a short squeeze” (Lamont, 2012). As a 
recent example, short sellers alleged that Tesla “embarked on a scheme… to completely decimate 
the Company’s short-sellers.”28 Halts are one technique whereby firms could impose additional 
risk on short sellers. If this technique is effective then firms with high short interests would have 
a stronger preference for halts. We proxy for short interests with the ratio of short positions to the 
number of shares outstanding (ShortInterest). 
4.2.4 CEO characteristics 
Prior research suggests manager style and networks are important for a wide range of corporate 
decisions. First, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document manager style (identified using manager 
fixed effects and characteristics) matters for a wide range of corporate decisions. For example, 
they conclude MBAs take more aggressive actions whereas older CEOs take more conservative 
actions. Second, Perry and Peyer (2005) argue CEOs can learn different strategies and build 
connections with other firms (i.e., have wider networks) by sitting on outside boards. Exposure to 
other views and experiences regarding halts likely alters CEO preferences. Ex ante there is no 
reason to expect CEO characteristics to be correlated with halts unless CEOs have the ability to 
influence halt decisions and CEO characteristics lead to different halt preferences. While we have 
                                                          
27 See, for example, Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 
2002; Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan 2010; and Drake, Rees, and Swanson, 2011. 
28 Kalman Isaacs vs. Elon Musk and Tesla, Case 3:18-cv-04865 filed 8/10/18 (Northern District of California, San 
Francisco Division) 
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no directional predictions, we predict CEO characteristics will be associated with halt outcomes. 
We include four CEO characteristic proxies based on the prior literature.  Following Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003), we include whether the CEO has an MBA (CEOMBA), the CEO’s age (CEOAge), 
and how many years the CEO has been in the position (CEOTenure). We also include the number 
of boards on which a CEO serves (CEOTotBoards) consistent with Perry and Peyer (2005). 
4.3 Indirect economic benefit analysis: empirical design and results  
Table 5 presents our tests of whether exchanges are influenced by constituent preferences when 
calling halts. Given exchange discretion is focused in the proactive halts, we provide two types of 
evidence.  First, we examine whether constituent preferences are associated with proactive halts 
where discretion is greatest.  Second, we examine whether the findings are significantly larger for 
proactive halts (i.e., those more likely based on judgment) than reactive halts (i.e., those more 
likely mechanical in nature).  Because reactive halts are almost entirely rules driven, they provide 
an effective control group to ensure that our proxies capture constituent preferences as opposed to 
simply proxying for expected returns and volatility. 
We first provide descriptive evidence on the proxies for constituent preferences for proactive 
and reactive halts in Panels A and B, respectively. For proactive halts (Panel A), we find significant 
differences between the halt and no halt samples for five of the eight proxies. Similarly, we find 
differences for five of the eight for reactive halts (Panel B). However, these tests do not distinguish 
between constituent preferences and differences in expected returns and volatility, so these results 
are descriptive in nature. We formally test for the influence of constituent preferences in Panel C 
where we include controls for expected returns and volatility.29  
                                                          
29 We also include a control for the news magnitude (AbsExtremeRet) as prior research suggests that market 
responses to bad news are larger than responses to good (Kothari et al, 2009). 
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Column 1 of Panel C provides evidence on our first test. All four of the variables with 
directional predictions (GoodNewsIndicator, CEOOpportunisticTrader, CEORoutineTrader, and 
ShortInterest) are significantly associated with halts, as expected. These variables are not only 
statistically significant but economically meaningful. Moving from good to bad news increases the 
proactive halt probability by 34.2%, having an opportunistic CEO trader decreases the probability 
by 21.1%, and having a CEO that engages in routine trading decreases the probability by 20.2%.30 
Similarly, when moving across the interquartile range of short interests, the probability increases 
by 9.3%.31 We also find all but one (CEOAge) of the four proxies without directional predictions 
are significantly associated with proactive halts. 
Column 3 provides evidence on our second test evaluating whether the results from the 
proactive halt tests (column 1) are significantly greater than those from the reactive halt tests 
(column 2). Consistent with expectations, the proactive results are significantly greater in the 
predicted direction for all four constituent preference proxies with directional predictions than the 
reactive results. We also find the proactive results are significantly greater (in an absolute sense) 
for all but two (CEOAge and CEOTenure) of the constituent preference proxies without directional 
predictions than the reactive results. Collectively, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that exchanges 
cater to their various constituents when deciding whether or not to call a halt.32 
                                                          
30 The increase from good to bad news of 34.2% is calculated by dividing the marginal effect (0.0063) by the 
probability of a good news proactive halt holding all other covariates at their mean (0.0184).  Similarly, the 
decrease in the presence of an opportunistic CEO trader is calculated by dividing the marginal effect (0.0050) by 
the probability of a proactive halt without an opportunistic CEO trader holding all other covariates at their mean 
(0.0237). The decrease in the presence of a CEO engaged in routine trading is calculated by dividing the marginal 
effect (0.0045) by the probability of a proactive halt without such a CEO holding all other covariates at their mean 
(0.0223). 
31 The probability of a proactive halt at the first (third) quartile of shorts, holding all other covariates at their mean is 
1.93% (2.11%). The difference of these two probabilities divided by the first quartile probability yields the 9.3% 
((2.11%-1.93%)/1.93%). The interquartile range of short interests is 1.3% to 5.3%. 
32 For robustness, we repeat the analyses in Panel C excluding the BoardEx variables (CEOMBA, CEOAge, 
CEOTenure, CEOTotBoards) to maximize sample size and find consistent results on the remaining variables. 
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5. Research Question 2: Is the discretion associated with the effectiveness of halts? 
We next examine two market consequences and their association with the portion of halt 
discretion that is not explained by expected returns and volatility. The two market consequences 
we evaluate are both consistent with a halt being ineffective – the likelihood of a small halt return 
(i.e., an unnecessary halt or a “miss”)33 and stock return reversals following the halt (i.e., the halt 
did not result in an efficient re-opening price). We proxy for halt discretion that is unexplained by 
expected returns and volatility using the residuals from a proactive halt model containing only the 
control variables in Table 4. The residuals are divided into quartiles with the lowest having the 
least unexplained discretion.  
Table 6 shows the results of regressing the two market consequences on the proxy for 
unexplained halt discretion. In Panel A, we examine the association between the level of 
unexplained halt discretion and the likelihood of calling an unnecessary halt (SmallHaltReturn).34 
In the first column we include a single variable capturing the quartile ranking (scaled between zero 
and one) of the unexplained residual (q(Residual)). In the second column we include indicators for 
quartiles 2-4 to compare them to the bottom quartile (lowest unexplained discretion) as a base 
group. The results in both columns show a positive association between the level of unexplained 
halt discretion and the likelihood of the exchange calling an unnecessary halt. 
In Panel B we examine the association between the unexplained halt discretion and return 
reversals in the ten minutes after the halt (PostHaltReturn). The first column includes the scaled 
quartile ranking of the unexplained residual (interacted with the return during the halt, HaltReturn) 
                                                          
33 We assume that a small halt window return reflects a lack of updating during the halt window (on average).  We 
do note that it is possible that a near-zero halt return could result from two unobserved and opposite price 
movements within the halt window, but we expect this situation to be uncommon. 
34 We define SmallHaltReturn as halt returns less than 50bp, however, our results are quantitatively similar if we 
choose the alternative threshold of 1 percent. 
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and the second column includes indicators for each quartile (interacted with HaltReturn). The 
results are consistent with increasing return reversals post-halt as the amount of unexplained 
discretion increases.35 Taken together, the results in Table 6 suggest that more discretionary halts 
(i.e., those that are unexplained by expected returns and volatility proxies) result in less effective 
halt outcomes. 
6. Conclusion 
Stock exchanges exercise discretion when calling trading halts, an important event during our 
period of study.  However, there is limited information on the halt decision. We investigate how 
exchanges use their discretion and whether the use of discretion alters the effectiveness of halts.  
We begin by testing the claim that exchanges hold discretion when calling halts. Ceteris 
parabis, the use of halts across NYSE and Nasdaq should be similar unless the exchanges use 
discretion and do so differently. We find strong evidence that the exchanges implement halts 
differently with Nasdaq having a greater propensity to call halts. 
Our study examines two research questions. First, we ask how exchanges use discretion when 
calling halts. While we do not find support for the importance of a direct economic benefit 
motivating halts, we find support for indirect economic benefits derived from constituent 
satisfaction. Collectively, the evidence suggests exchanges cater to their various constituents when 
deciding whether to call a halt. Second, we ask whether the use of discretion by exchanges is 
associated with halt effectiveness. We find the level of halt discretion not explained by expected 
returns and volatility is positively associated with two measures of halt ineffectiveness (small halt 
returns (i.e., unnecessary halts or a “misses”) and larger stock return reversals after the halt), 
suggesting halts with more unexplained discretion are less effective. 
                                                          
35 The reversal results are robust to excluding observations where there are small halt returns (SmallHaltReturn=1), 
results untabulated. 
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To our knowledge this is the first study to identify that exchanges have discretion when calling 
halts and investigate how they use this discretion. Our study contributes by showing that halt 
outcomes reflect the preferences of exchange constituents, consistent with critiques in popular 
press that “exchanges have become beholden to the companies they list” (WSJ, 2018). We also 
show exchange discretion results in less effective halts, which is especially important given the 
ongoing regulatory debates about the optimal use of halts. Finally, we contribute by providing a 
simple strategy to identify the halts most subject to exchange discretion, providing future 
researchers the ability to identify halt type or level of halt discretion across exchanges.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Trading Halt Variables: 
 Halt = 1 if there is an individual stock trading halt, 0 otherwise. 
 Proactive_Halt = 1 if there is a proactive-individual stock trading halt, 0 otherwise. We 
define a halt as proactive if the 5-minute return immediately preceding 
the halt (calculated using midpoints of the bid-ask spread) is less than 5 
percent. 
 Reactive_Halt = 1 if there is a reactive-individual stock trading halt, 0 otherwise. We 
define a halt as reactive if the 5-minute return immediately preceding 
the halt (calculated using midpoints of the bid-ask spread) is greater 
than or equal to 5 percent. 
 
Independent Variables of Interest: 
 NYSE = 1 if the firm is listed on NYSE, 0 if the firm is listed on Nasdaq. 
 GoodNewsIndicator = 1 if the most extreme daily return from the current quarter is positive, 0 
otherwise. 
 CEORoutineTrader = 1 if the CEO’s trading is defined as routine, 0 if the trading is not 
defined as routine or the CEO does not trade during the 15-month 
period ending with the current quarter. Following Cohen, Malloy, and 
Pomorski (2012), we classify a CEO as a routine trader if she trades in 
the same direction (buy or sell) and the same month for three 
consecutive years. 
 CEOOpportunisticTrader = 1 if the CEO trades stock but does not meet the definition of 
CEORoutineTrader, 0 if CEORoutineTrader=1 or the CEO does not 
trade during the 15-month period ending with the current quarter. 
 CEOMBA = 1 if the CEO has an MBA (per BoardEx), 0 otherwise. 
 CEOAge = CEO age (per BoardEx). 
 CEOTenure = number of years the CEO has been in his position (per BoardEx).  
 CEOTotBoards = number of boards the CEO serves on for quoted firms (per BoardEx). 
 ShortInterest = Number of short sale positions in the company (as of the end of the 
prior quarter), scaled by the number of shares outstanding. 
Control Variables: 
 LnMVE = log (market value of equity as of the end of the prior quarter). 
 Volume = volume (in billions of shares) in the prior quarter. 
 Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns in the prior quarter. 
 LnNumAnalysts = log (1 + number of analysts following the firm in the prior quarter) 
 InstOwn = the proportion of shares (from 0 to 1) owned by institutional investors 
as of the end of the prior quarter, calculated using data from Thomson 
Reuters. 
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 AbsExtremeRet = the absolute value of the most extreme daily return from the current 
quarter, where extreme is the largest in magnitude regardless of sign. 
 AbsQtrRet = the absolute value of the stock return for the current quarter. 
 LnNum8Ks = log (1 + number of 8-Ks filed with the SEC during the current quarter). 
 MgmtFcst = 1 if there is a management forecast issued during the current quarter, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Market Consequence Variables: 
We compute returns based on the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for halts with regular quotes. We 
exclude observations with spreads more than 100 percent of the midpoint in the window beginning 10-
minutes before the halt through 10-minutes after. 
 HaltReturn = The stock return over the halt period.  
 PreHaltReturn = The stock return in the 10-minutes preceding the halt.  
 PostHaltReturn = The stock return in the 10-minutes following the halt.  
 SmallHaltReturn = 1 if the HaltReturn is less than 50bp, 0 otherwise. 
 Residual = the portion of a proactive halt unexplained by expected returns or 
volatility, calculated as the residual (i.e., one minus the predicted 
probability) from the logistic model for proactive halts using the 
control variables in Table 4. 
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Figure 1: Average number of individual stock trading halts per day 
This figure shows the average number of individual stock trading halts, per day, between 2012 and 2015. Panel A shows the results for all single stock halts. 
Panel B shows the results for the halt sample. 
 
Panel A: All halts 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Sample halts 
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Figure 2: Percent of traded firms halted  
This figure shows the percent of listed firms on NYSE and Nasdaq that have halts each quarter between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2015 for the halts 
sample as well as the proactive and reactive subsamples. 
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Figure 3: Returns surrounding halts 
These figures plot the 30 second returns for the 10 minutes before the halt and 10 minutes following the halt. We 
compute returns based on the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for halts with regular quotes and spreads less than 100 
percent of the midpoint during this window (n=4,824 halts). Panel A provides the returns for all halts while Panel B 
partitions proactive and reactive halts. Halts are partitioned into proactive (reactive) if the 5-minute return 
immediately preceding the halt is less than (greater than or equal to) 5 percent. Good (bad) news halts as those 
observations where the return 10 minutes on either side of the halt is greater than (less than or equal to) zero. 
 
Panel A: All halts  
 
Panel B: Proactive and reactive halts 
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Figure 4: CEO Trading Around Halts 
These figures plot the number of CEO trades (e.g., buying and selling events) from 10 trading days before the halt to 
10 trading days after. Panel A plots the CEO transactions for halts that do not have an earnings announcement 
within one trading day of the halt. Panel B plots the CEO transactions for halts that have an earnings announcement 
within one trading day of the halt. The solid (dashed) line plots CEO transactions surrounding proactive (reactive) 
halts.  
 
Panel A: Non-earnings announcement halts 
 
 
Panel B: Earnings announcement halts  
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Table 1: Halt identification and halt descriptives 
This table shows details on the halts that we identify during the sample period (2012-2015). Panel A shows how we 
arrive at the sample of individual stock trading halts and the unique firms (unique TAQ symbols) that underlies the 
sample. Panel B provides descriptive statistics on these individual firm halts.  
 
Panel A: Halt identification 
 
 
Panel B: Halt descriptives 
 
 
 
Other Notes: 
(1) Halts beginning in the same 5-second window on different Nasdaq exchanges (i.e., exchange codes “T”, “B”, and 
“X”) are considered to be the same halt. 
(2) Halts on dates with more than 1,000 halts in the day are excluded. This consisted of four dates: 3/25/13, 8/22/13, 
11/22/13, and 8/24/15. No other dates had 200 or more halts. Media reports acknowledge exchange-wide 
shutdowns on 8/22/13 and 8/24/15 (see for example: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nasdaq-halt-tapec-
idUSBRE97L0V420130822 and http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/24/investing/stocks-markets-selloff-circuit-
breakers-1200-times/)  
 
 
  
Halt 
Observations
Unique 
Symbols
Total distinct NYSE/Nasdaq/AMEX Halts identified in TAQ (1) 27,787 5,625
Less: halts on days with extreme halt activity (i.e., exchange-wide halts) (2) (5,828) (1,298)
All Individual Stock Trading Halts 21,959 4,327
Less: halts without CUSIP/Company identification information in TAQ (2,006) (119)
Less: halts without a successful merge to CRSP (6,935) (600)
Less: halts that relate to securities other than common stock or ADRs
(i.e., only include SHRCD=10, 11, 12, 30, 31)
(1,205) (516)
Less: halts without a successful merge to COMPUSTAT (or no available CIK) (449) (40)
Less: halts with trading during the halt (1,612) (490)
Restrict to one halt per day (select first halt with 5-min preceding returns) (1,347) 0
Less: AMEX Halts (491) (171)
Sample Individual Stock Trading Halts 7,914 2,391
N Mean 25th Median 75th StdDev
Halt Duration (in minutes) 7,914 101.019 5.000 6.774 36.142 233.947
2 day Absolute Return (begin close before halt) 7,374 10.9% 1.3% 4.6% 12.8% 16.8%
Good News Indicator (2 trading day return) 7,374 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500
Absolute Return 10 minutes before halt begins 4,888 6.3% 0.5% 2.7% 8.6% 8.7%
Absolute Return during the halt (halt to resume) 4,888 6.6% 1.0% 3.2% 7.7% 9.6%
Absolute Return 10 minutes after trading resumes 4,888 4.0% 0.3% 1.9% 5.6% 5.4%
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Table 2: Sample selection 
This table shows the sample selection details, both at the firm-quarter and unique firm (based on PERMNO) levels, 
for the primary sample used in this study.  
 
 
  
Firm 
Quarters
Unique 
Firms
CRSP Firm Quarters with MVE available at end of calendar quarter 109,939 8,723
Less: observations where MVE is missing at end of prior calendar quarter (2,151) (124)
Less: observations that relate to securities other than common stock or ADRs 
(i.e., only include SHRCD=10, 11, 12, 30, 31)
(36,337) (2,974)
Less: observations with missing CIKs in Compustat merge (653) (42)
Less: AMEX observations (exchcd=2) (4,338) (170)
Total firm quarters 66,460 5,413
Total firm quarters with halts 3,764
Percent of firm quarters with halts 5.66%
41 
 
Table 3: Halt classification and descriptive statistics of proactive and reactive halts 
This table provides details of our halt classification scheme to categorize halts as proactive and reactive. Panel A 
demonstrates the classification scheme and provides the TAQ quote code for reference purposes. Proactive and 
reactive halts are defined based on the 5-minute return preceding the halt, where those with returns less than (greater 
than or equal to) 5 percent are coded as proactive (reactive). We code observations where the 5-minute return is not 
calculable as missing (i.e., they are left out of the total classifiable observations count). Panel B provides univariate 
statistics to across proactive and reactive halts.  
 
Panel A: Halt classification 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate statics across proactive and reactive halts 
 
 
 
  
 
All Halts
Classification of Halts
Reactive Halts 23 8% 125 32% 193 84% 2,519 45% 2,860 44%
Proactive Halts 265 92% 262 68% 37 16% 3,072 55% 3,636 56%
Classified Halts 288 100% 387 100% 230 100% 5,591 100% 6,496 100%
Unable to Classify
(No Returns Info)
78 82 9 1,249 1,418
Total Halts 366 469 239 6,840  7,914 
6,840
News Dissemination or 
News Pending
"D" or "P"
366
Order 
Imbalance
Additional 
Information
Non-Firm
Quote
"M""I" "N"
Total
7,914
NASDAQ
Quote Condition Code (TAQ Description)
NYSE
469 239
n Mean Median n Mean Median Mean Median
Halt Duration (in minutes) 3,636 80.680 10.750 2,860 53.777 5.085 <0.01 <0.01
2 day Absolute Return (begin close before halt) 3,463 8.91% 4.17% 2,736 12.76% 5.65% <0.01 <0.01
Good News Indicator (2 trading day return) 3,463 0.485 0.000 2,736 0.510 1.000 0.06
Absolute Return 10 minutes before halt begins 3,143 1.84% 0.94% 1,745 14.21% 11.18% <0.01 <0.01
Absolute Return during the halt (halt to resume) 3,143 6.51% 2.74% 1,745 6.84% 3.90% 0.23 <0.01
Absolute Return 10 minutes after trading resumes 3,143 3.63% 1.40% 1,745 4.72% 2.93% <0.01 <0.01
Test of Difference
(p-values)Proactive Halts Reactive Halts
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Table 4: Tests evaluating exchange halt discretion  
This table examines whether NYSE and Nasdaq make different halting decisions, controlling for listing firm 
characteristics and information content. Panel A provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests across the halt 
(Halt) and no-halt samples. Panel B provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests across the NYSE and Nasdaq 
samples. Tests of differences are based on two-sided t-tests for means, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for medians, and χ2 
tests for binary variables. Panel C provides multivariate logistic regressions of halts on the exchange indicator 
(NYSE). Column (1) presents the results with control variables, time and industry fixed effects. Column (2) presents 
the results after entropy balancing the NYSE and Nasdaq samples based on the control variables and fixed effects in 
Column (1) across three moments (mean, variance, and skewness). Column (3) presents the results for proactive 
halts after entropy balancing, as in Column (2). Column (4) presents the entropy-balanced results for reactive halts. 
Column (5) tests the differences between Columns (3) and (4) using seemingly unrelated regression techniques for a 
linear probability model. Time fixed effects use quarter-years and industry fixed effects use 2-digit SIC codes. 
Variable definitions provided in Appendix A. Regression marginal effects are calculated holding all other covariates 
at the sample mean. Standard errors are Huber/White robust estimators clustered by firm.  
 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics across Halt and Non-Halt Firm Quarters 
 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate Statistics across NYSE and Nasdaq Firm Quarters 
 
  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
NYSE t 0.2067 0.0000 0.4346 0.0000 <0.01
LnMVE t-1 5.4944 5.3478 6.5709 6.5430 <0.01 <0.01
Volume t-1 0.0516 0.0072 0.0642 0.0170 <0.01 <0.01
Volatility t-1 0.0404 0.0336 0.0246 0.0204 <0.01 <0.01
LnNumAnalysts t-1 1.2009 1.0986 1.6670 1.7918 <0.01 <0.01
InstOwn t-1 0.4002 0.3494 0.5163 0.5642 <0.01 <0.01
AbsExtremeRet t 0.1771 0.1357 0.0916 0.0686 <0.01 <0.01
AbsQtrRet t 0.2246 0.1667 0.1483 0.1040 <0.01 <0.01
LnNum8Ks t 1.1545 1.3863 1.1028 1.0986 <0.01 <0.01
MgmtFcst t 0.3329 0.0000 0.4813 0.0000 <0.01
Halt=1 Halt=0
(n= 3,764) (n= 62,696) (p-values)
Test of Difference
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Halt t 0.0278 0.0000 0.0777 0.0000 <0.01
LnMVE t-1 7.6268 7.6578 5.6954 5.6042 <0.01 <0.01
Volume t-1 0.0975 0.0379 0.0387 0.0080 <0.01 <0.01
Volatility t-1 0.0209 0.0177 0.0289 0.0240 <0.01 <0.01
LnNumAnalysts t-1 2.0426 2.1972 1.3475 1.3863 <0.01 <0.01
InstOwn t-1 0.5876 0.6798 0.4530 0.4398 <0.01 <0.01
AbsExtremeRet t 0.0758 0.0581 0.1115 0.0831 <0.01 <0.01
AbsQtrRet t 0.1334 0.0975 0.1666 0.1151 <0.01 <0.01
LnNum8Ks t 1.0652 1.0986 1.1353 1.0986 <0.01 <0.01
MgmtFcst t 0.5790 1.0000 0.3956 0.0000 <0.01
NYSE=1 NYSE=0 Test of Difference
(n= 28,028) (n= 38,432) (p-values)
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Multivariate logistic regressions 
 
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Test (3) - (4) = 0
Margin Margin Margin Margin p-value
NYSE t -0.0198 -7.85 *** -0.0131 -4.06 *** -0.0075 -3.28 *** -0.0017 -0.97 <0.01
Prior Quarter Control Variables
LnMVE t-1 0.0003 0.30
Volume t-1 0.0251 2.38 **
Volatility t-1 0.1593 1.49
LnNumAnalysts t-1 -0.0105 -6.60 ***
InstOwn t-1 0.0046 1.20
Current Quarter Control Variables
AbsExtremeRet t 0.2103 12.46 ***
AbsQtrRet t 0.0040 0.92
LnNum8Ks t 0.0043 2.68 ***
MgmtFcst t -0.0030 -1.36
Fixed Effects
Psuedo R-Square
Area under ROC
N 66,267 66,308
NA
Time, Industry No
(2)
Halt t
0.767
0.126 0.004
z-stat z-stat
Pooled
Entropy-Balanced
[all covariates in (1)]
Entropy-Balanced
[all covariates in (1)]
(4)
z-stat
Entropy-Balanced
[all covariates in (1)]
 Proactive_Halt t Reactive_Halt tHalt t
(3)
z-stat
(1)
66,308
No
0.001
NA
0.004
NA
65,863
No
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Table 5: Tests evaluating halts and constituent preferences 
This table provides details on the tests of whether constituent preferences are associated with halts. Panel A (Panel 
B) provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests for proactive (reactive) halts. Tests of differences are based on 
two-sided t-tests for means, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for medians, and χ2 tests for binary variables. Panel C provides 
multivariate logistic regressions.  Column (1) examines the association between proactive halts and the constituent 
preference proxies. Column (2) examines the association between reactive halts and the constituent preference 
proxies. Column (3) tests the differences between Columns (1) and (2) using seemingly unrelated regression 
techniques for a linear probability model. Time fixed effects use quarter-years and industry fixed effects use 2-digit 
SIC codes. Variable definitions provided in Appendix A. Regression marginal effects are calculated holding all 
other covariates at the sample mean. Regression standard errors are Huber/White robust estimators clustered by 
firm. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics across Proactive Halt and Non-Proactive Halt Firm Quarters 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate Statistics across Reactive Halt and Non-Reactive Halt Firm Quarters 
 
 
 
  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
GoodNewsIndicator t 0.5718 1.0000 0.5861 1.0000 0.28
CEOOpportunisticTrader t 0.5223 1.0000 0.5306 1.0000 0.54
CEORoutineTrader t 0.2229 0.0000 0.3055 0.0000 <0.01
ShortInterest t-1 0.0607 0.0241 0.0461 0.0260 <0.01 <0.01
CEOMBA t 0.3234 0.0000 0.3712 0.0000 <0.01
CEOAge t 56.3340 56.0000 56.5108 56.0000 0.38 0.09
CEOTenure t 5.4116 2.9000 5.3057 3.5000 0.48 0.01
CEOTotBoards t 2.1621 1.0000 2.0785 2.0000 0.05 0.42
(n= 1,413) (n= 45,778) (p-values)
Proactive_Halt=1 Proactive_Halt=0 Test of Difference
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
GoodNewsIndicator t 0.6278 1.0000 0.5848 1.0000 0.01
CEOOpportunisticTrader t 0.5373 1.0000 0.5302 1.0000 0.68
CEORoutineTrader t 0.1742 0.0000 0.3055 0.0000 <0.01
ShortInterest t-1 0.0409 0.0090 0.0466 0.0262 <0.01 <0.01
CEOMBA t 0.3609 0.0000 0.3699 0.0000 0.58
CEOAge t 56.5249 56.0000 56.5051 56.0000 0.94 0.71
CEOTenure t 5.1740 2.4000 5.3115 3.5000 0.47 <0.01
CEOTotBoards t 2.1063 1.0000 2.0805 2.0000 0.63 <0.01
(n= 884) (n= 46,307) (p-values)
Reactive_Halt=1 Reactive_Halt=0 Test of Difference
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Multivariate logistic regressions 
 
 
 
  
Test (1) - (2) = 0
(3)
Pred Margin Margin p-value
Constituent Preference Variables
GoodNewsIndicator t (-) -0.0063 -4.98 *** -0.0022 -2.63 *** <0.01
CEOOpportunisticTrader t (-) -0.0050 -2.73 *** -0.0010 -0.96 0.03
CEORoutineTrader t (-) -0.0045 -2.00 ** -0.0010 -0.75 0.04
ShortInterest t-1 (+) 0.0463 5.50 *** -0.0061 -0.69 <0.01
CEOMBA t (+/-) -0.0031 -2.07 ** 0.0006 0.63 <0.01
CEOAge t (+/-) 0.0000 -0.36 0.0000 0.43 0.30
CEOTenure t (+/-) 0.0003 1.85 * 0.0002 2.06 ** 0.62
CEOTotBoards t (+/-) 0.0013 2.79 *** 0.0005 1.69 * 0.09
Prior Quarter Control Variables
LnMVE t-1 -0.0001 -0.16 -0.0005 -1.28
Volume t-1 0.0232 3.07 *** 0.0093 2.32 **
Volatility t-1 0.1314 1.36 0.2548 4.81 ***
LnNumAnalysts t-1 -0.0069 -5.37 *** -0.0050 -7.20 ***
InstOwn t-1 -0.0025 -0.78 -0.0003 -0.13
Current Quarter Control Variables
NYSE t -0.0102 -4.54 *** 0.0010 0.80
AbsExtremeRet t 0.0827 5.37 *** 0.0276 3.19 ***
AbsQtrRet t -0.0045 -1.13 -0.0021 -0.94
LnNum8Ks t 0.0003 0.22 -0.0008 -0.90
MgmtFcst t 0.0021 1.14 -0.0002 -0.25
Fixed Effects
Psuedo R-Square
Area under ROC
N 46,441 44,837
Time, Industry Time, Industry
0.096 0.167
0.748 0.808
Dependent Variable:
z-stat z-stat
Proactive_Halt t Reactive_Halt t
(1) (2)
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Table 6: Market consequences associated with unexplained discretion 
This table provides details on the tests of market consequences associated with unexplained discretion. Panel A 
provides multivariate logistic regressions to examine the association between small halt returns and the level of 
unexplained halt discretion. Panel B provides multivariate regressions to examine the association between post-halt 
stock return reversals and the level of unexplained halt discretion. We proxy for unexplained halt discretion using 
the residual (i.e., one minus the predicted probability) from a proactive halt model containing the control variables in 
Table 4; q(Residual) is the quartile (scaled between zero and one) of this residual; qN-Residual is a dummy variable 
set to one if the residual is in the Nth quartile. This analysis uses all proactive halts with available stock return data. 
Variable definitions provided in Appendix A. Regression marginal effects are calculated holding all other covariates 
at the sample mean. Standard errors are Huber/White robust estimators clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Small halt return tests 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Stock return reversal tests 
 
 
  
Margin Margin
Primary Variable(s)
q(Residual t ) 0.0766 2.25 **
q2-Residual t -0.0045 -0.14
q3-Residual t 0.0219 0.73
q4-Residual t 0.0781 2.10 **
Psuedo R-Square
Area under ROC
N
0.550 0.552
2,923 2,923
0.005 0.006
Dependent Variable: SmallHaltReturn t
(1) (2)
z-stat z-stat
Coef. Coef.
Primary Variable(s)
HaltReturn t -0.0187 -0.74
q(Residual t ) x HaltReturn t -0.2408 -5.83 ***
q1-Residual t  x HaltReturn t -0.0171 -0.62
q2-Residual t  x HaltReturn t -0.1196 -2.78 ***
q3-Residual t  x HaltReturn t -0.1457 -3.62 ***
q4-Residual t  x HaltReturn t -0.2732 -8.73 ***
Control Variable(s)
PreHaltReturn t -0.0620 -1.37 -0.0629 -1.39
Adjusted R-Square
N 2,9232,923
0.074 0.074
(1) (2)
t-stat t-stat
Dependent Variable: PostHaltReturn t
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Internet Appendix – Robustness to alternative sample using 8-K filings 
 
A1. Sample 
For robustness we perform the primary analyses using a sample based on 8-K filings. As halts 
result from material information (actual or rumor-based) and the SEC requires firms to file 8-Ks 
to “announce major events,” we examine when 8-Ks are associated with halts.36 For each halt, we 
determine whether there was an 8-K on the day of or day prior to the halt.37 When multiple 8-Ks 
are filed in this window, we choose the 8-K closest to the halt. The remaining unmatched 8-K 
filings comprise the no-halt sample. 
Table A1 provides details on sample selection. The sample begins with the population of 8-Ks 
filed with the SEC from 2012-2015, downloaded from EDGAR using Python. We then use Python 
to obtain acceptance dates and times, 8-K line item types, company identification information, and 
other details. This procedure results in 298,695 8-K filings. We again apply similar filters to those 
used for the halt sample (merge to Compustat/CRSP/TAQ, drop ETFs, drop AMEX) and require 
the observations to have non-missing two-day returns surrounding the 8-K filing date (the returns 
window begins at the market close preceding the 8-K acceptance) and prior quarter controls. This 
results in 168,187 8-Ks across 4,189 firms. Finally, we merge the resulting sample with the halt 
sample by matching 8-Ks to a halt on the day of or the day after the 8-K acceptance date. In the 
event that a halt is matched to multiple 8-Ks, we select the match with the closest proximity 
between the 8-K acceptance date/time and the time the halt begins (i.e., the closest 8-K is coded 
as a halt, whereas the other 8-Ks are coded as no halt). This results in 1,513 halt 8-Ks.   
                                                          
36 See https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html as of 4/13/2017. 
37 The flexible matching allows for the possibility that filings occurring late in the day may affect trading early in the 
following day. 
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A2. Asymmetry in halts based on the direction of underlying news 
Table A2 parallels the results of Table 4, but uses the 8-K sample. The univariate results in 
Panel A show differences between the halt and no-halt samples for the exchange listing and control 
variables. Similar to the firm-quarter sample, a smaller proportion of NYSE 8-Ks are associated 
with halts. NYSE observations (NYSE) represent 42% of the no-halt sample but only 24% of the 
halt sample, suggesting Nasdaq has a greater propensity to call halts. Also consistent with the firm-
quarter sample, the absolute return surrounding the 8-K is significantly larger for filings associated 
with halts than those not associated with halts. For the 8-K sample, we use AbsEventRet, which 
equals the two-day return from the day of the 8-K through the day following. This window should 
capture the “news” surrounding the halt event regardless of whether the halt occurs before the 
news (e.g., a proactive halt) or after (e.g., a reactive halt).  
Panel B provides details on the most frequent 8-K topics in the sample. There are 18 topics 
(out of 31 possible) that are associated with halt events. As each 8-K can have more than one topic, 
we tabulate the percent of halts associated with each topic, such that the percentages across topics 
exceed 100%. Five topics are associated with at least 5% of the halt events. The two most frequent 
topics are Financial Statements and Exhibits (I901) and Results of Operations and Financial 
Condition (I202) that are associated with 85% and 46% of the sample, respectively.  
Panel C shows univariate tests across NYSE and Nasdaq for the 8-K sample. Of primary 
interest, Nasdaq stocks are 2.4 times more likely to be halted than NYSE stocks (1.2% of firm 
quarters versus 0.5%). In addition, NYSE and Nasdaq listed firms differ on all characteristics and 
events shown, similar to the firm-quarter sample. 
Panel D shows the logistic regression results of our tests of whether NYSE and Nasdaq call 
halts differently. While we include the same prior quarter controls as in Table 4, we replace the 
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current quarter controls with a series of event window control variables. As noted above, to capture 
the likely news associated with the halt, we control for the two-day event return (AbsEventReturn) 
rather than the most extreme return of the quarter. We also include indicators for whether the filing 
was made during market hours (MktHoursIndicator) and the most frequent 8-K topics. The results 
in Panel D provide evidence consistent with those in Table 4 that exchanges have discretion when 
calling halts and use it differently. 
A3. Differential use of halts across exchanges 
The analyses in Table A3 parallel those of Table 5 using the 8-K sample. Panel A provides the 
univariate tests of proactive halts for the proxies of constituent preferences. Panel B provides the 
same tests for the reactive halts.  
We formally test whether proactive halt decisions are associated with constituent preferences 
in Panel C. Similar to the firm-quarter tests, EventGoodNewsIndicator, CEOOpportunisticTrader, 
and ShortInterest are significantly associated with halts (Column 1), as expected. Further, the 
proactive results are significantly greater (in an absolute sense) for each of these variables (Column 
3). However, we do not find significant associations between proactive halts and 
CEORoutineTrader or for the four proxies without directional predictions. Collectively, the 
evidence in Table A3 further supports that exchanges cater to their various constituents when 
deciding whether or not to call a halt.38 
A4. Results for proactive and reactive halts 
The analyses in Table A4 parallel those of Table 6 using the 8-K sample. This table examines 
the association between unexplained halt discretion and ineffective halt outcomes. We examine 
likelihood of calling an unnecessary halt (SmallHaltReturn) in Panel A and return reversals in the 
                                                          
38 For robustness, we repeat the analyses in Panel C excluding the BoardEx variables (CEOMBA, CEOAge, 
CEOTenure, CEOTotBoards) to maximize sample size and find consistent results on the remaining variables. 
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ten minutes after the halt (PostHaltReturn) in Panel B. We proxy for halt discretion that is 
unexplained by expected returns and volatility using the residuals from a proactive halt model 
containing only the control variables in Table A2. Consistent with the firm-quarter findings in 
Table 6, the results here suggest more discretionary halts (i.e., those that are unexplained by firm 
information or fundamentals) result in less effective halt outcomes (i.e., more small halt returns 
and greater post-halt return reversals). 
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Table A1: Sample selection (8-K sample) 
This table shows the sample selection details, both at the 8-K and unique firm (based on CIK) levels, for the 
alternative sample used for robustness in this study. 
 
  
#8-Ks
Unique 
Firms
8-Ks filed on EDGAR 2012-2015 298,695 11,094
Less: observations without a CIK merge to Compustat (44,343) (3,944)
Less: observations without a CRSP merge (49,904) (2,074)
Less: observations with missing returns surrounding 8-K filing date (4,725) (49)
Less: observations without a link to TAQ (70) 0
Less: observations that relate to securities other than common stock or ADRs 
(i.e., only include SHRCD=10, 11, 12, 30, 31)
(19,894) (530)
Less: observations with missing prior quarter controls (2,539) (62)
Less: AMEX observations (exchcd=2) (9,033) (246)
Total 8-Ks 168,187 4,189
Total 8-Ks with halts 1,513
Percent of 8-Ks with halts 0.90%
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Table A2: Tests evaluating exchange halt discretion (8-K sample) 
This table examines whether NYSE and Nasdaq make different halting decisions, controlling for listing firm 
characteristics and information content, using the 8-K sample. Panel A provides descriptive statistics and univariate 
tests across the halt (Halt) and no-halt samples. Panel B shows the details on the 8-K topics associated with trading 
halts. Pct of Total is the percent of filings that include the given topic (percents sum to greater than 100% as some 
filings include more than one topic). Panel C provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests across the NYSE and 
Nasdaq samples. Tests of differences are based on two-sided t-tests for means, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for 
medians, and χ2 tests for binary variables. Panel D provides multivariate logistic regressions of halts on the exchange 
indicator (NYSE). Column (1) presents the results with control variables, time and industry fixed effects. Column (2) 
presents the results after entropy balancing the NYSE and Nasdaq samples based on the control variables and fixed 
effects in Column (1) across three moments (mean, variance, and skewness). Column (3) presents the results for 
proactive halts after entropy balancing, as in Column (2). Column (4) presents the entropy-balanced results for 
reactive halts. Column (5) tests the differences between Columns (3) and (4) using seemingly unrelated regression 
techniques for a linear probability model. Time fixed effects use quarter-years and industry fixed effects use 2-digit 
SIC codes. Variables defined in Internet Appendix Variable Definitions following the tables. Regression marginal 
effects are calculated holding all other covariates at the sample mean. Standard errors are Huber/White robust 
estimators clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Univariate statistics across Halt and Non-Halt 8-Ks 
 
 
  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
NYSE t 0.2366 0.0000 0.4235 0.0000 <0.01
LnMVE t-1 6.1085 6.1422 6.8020 6.7727 <0.01 <0.01
Volume t-1 0.0786 0.0181 0.0884 0.0233 0.04 <0.01
Volatility t-1 0.0387 0.0312 0.0254 0.0204 <0.01 <0.01
LnNumAnalysts t-1 1.6050 1.7918 1.8185 1.9459 <0.01 <0.01
InstOwn t-1 0.5357 0.5783 0.5777 0.6407 <0.01 <0.01
AbsEventRet t 0.0961 0.0818 0.0365 0.0214 <0.01 <0.01
MktHoursIndicator t 0.1851 0.0000 0.2223 0.0000 <0.01
Halt=1 Halt=0
(n= 1,513) (n= 166,674) (p-values)
Test of Difference
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Table A2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Frequency of 8-K topics associated with trading halts 
 
 
 
Panel C: Univariate statistics across NYSE and Nasdaq 8-Ks 
  
 
Line # Line Description Frequency Pct of Total Frequency Pct of Total
I901 Financial Statements and Exhibits 1,284 84.9% 123,510 74.1%
I202 Results of Operations and Financial Condition 689 45.5% 51,358 30.8%
I801 Other Events 470 31.1% 38,871 23.3%
I701 Regulation FD Disclosure 304 20.1% 31,509 18.9%
I101 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement 232 15.3% 19,979 12.0%
I302 Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities 50 3.3% 2,288 1.4%
I503 Amend Articles, Bylaws, Fiscal Year End 37 2.4% 4,197 2.5%
I507 Submit Matters to a Vote of Security Holders 31 2.0% 12,989 7.8%
I301 Notice of Delisting / Transfer of Listing 27 1.8% 1,389 0.8%
I402 Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financials 25 1.7% 260 0.2%
I203 Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation 21 1.4% 7,702 4.6%
I201 Acquisition or Disposition of Assets 21 1.4% 2,670 1.6%
I102 Termination of a Material Definitive Agreement 20 1.3% 2,081 1.2%
I206 Material Impairments 10 0.7% 351 0.2%
I204 Events that Increase Direct Financial Obligation 6 0.4% 187 0.1%
I401 Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant 4 0.3% 785 0.5%
I103 Bankruptcy or Receivership 4 0.3% 26 0.0%
I504 Suspend Trading Under Employee Benefit Plans 1 0.1% 138 0.1%
Halt=1 Halt=0
(n= 1,513) (n= 166,674)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Halt t 0.0050 0.0000 0.0119 0.0000 <0.01
LnMVE t-1 7.9959 7.9262 5.9201 5.8121 <0.01 <0.01
Volume t-1 0.1349 0.0509 0.0543 0.0114 0.0400 <0.01
Volatility t-1 0.0204 0.0172 0.0292 0.0238 <0.01 <0.02
LnNumAnalysts t-1 2.2732 2.3979 1.4834 1.6094 <0.01 <0.03
InstOwn t-1 0.6925 0.7468 0.4933 0.5022 <0.01 <0.04
AbsEventRet t 0.0317 0.0190 0.0409 0.0239 <0.01 <0.05
MktHoursIndicator t 0.2103 0.0000 0.2305 0.0000 <0.06
I901_Indicator t 0.7509 1.0000 0.7355 1.0000 <0.07
I801_Indicator t 0.2201 0.0000 0.2440 0.0000 <0.08
I701_Indicator t 0.2314 0.0000 0.1583 0.0000 <0.09
I202_Indicator t 0.3066 0.0000 0.3115 0.0000 <0.10
I101_Indicatort 0.1194 0.0000 0.1207 0.0000 <0.11
NYSE=1 NYSE=0 Test of Difference
(n= 70,946) (n= 97,241) (p-values)
54 
 
Table A2 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Multivariate logistic regressions 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Sample:
Test (3) - (4) = 0
Margin Margin Margin Margin p-value
NYSE t -0.0028 -6.38 *** -0.0029 -3.69 *** -0.0021 -3.86 *** 0.0003 0.87 <0.01
Prior Quarter Control Variables
LnMVE t-1 0.0001 0.64
Volume t-1 0.0005 0.37
Volatility t-1 0.0524 5.35 ***
LnNumAnalysts t-1 -0.0004 -1.23
InstOwn t-1 0.0025 3.58 ***
Event Window Controls
AbsEventRet t 0.0650 25.79 ***
MktHoursIndicator t 0.0007 1.84 *
I901_Indicator t 0.0015 3.84 ***
I801_Indicator t 0.0043 10.76 ***
I701_Indicator t 0.0027 6.20 ***
I202_Indicator t 0.0030 7.39 ***
I101_Indicator t 0.0034 6.65 ***
Fixed Effects
Psuedo R-Square
Area under ROC
N
Pooled
Entropy-Balanced
[all covariates in (1)]
Entropy-Balanced
[all covariates in (1)]
Entropy-Balanced
[all covariates in (1)]
Halt t Halt t  Proactive_Halt t Reactive_Halt t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
z-stat z-stat z-stat z-stat
Time, Industry No No No
0.131 0.004 0.006 0.001
0.809 NA NA NA
167,296 167,872 167,609 167,605
55 
 
Table A3: Tests evaluating halts and constituent preferences (8-K sample) 
This table provides details on the tests of whether constituent preferences are associated with halts, using the 8-K 
sample. Panel A (Panel B) provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests for proactive (reactive) halts. Tests of 
differences are based on two-sided t-tests for means, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for medians, and χ2 tests for binary 
variables. Panel C provides multivariate logistic regressions.  Column (1) examines the association between 
proactive halts and the constituent preference proxies. Column (2) examines the association between reactive halts 
and the constituent preference proxies. Column (3) tests the differences between Columns (1) and (2) using 
seemingly unrelated regression techniques for a linear probability model. Time fixed effects use quarter-years and 
industry fixed effects use 2-digit SIC codes. Variables defined in Internet Appendix Variable Definitions following 
the tables. Regression marginal effects are calculated holding all other covariates at the sample mean. Regression 
standard errors are Huber/White robust estimators clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Univariate statistics across Proactive Halt and Non-Proactive Halt 8-Ks 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate statistics across Reactive Halt and Non-Reactive Halt 8-Ks 
 
 
  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
EventGoodNewsIndicator t 0.4060 0.0000 0.5150 1.0000 <0.01
CEOOpportunisticTrader t 0.5466 1.0000 0.5605 1.0000 0.46
CEORoutineTrader t 0.2712 0.0000 0.3088 0.0000 0.03
ShortInterest t-1 0.0736 0.0391 0.0488 0.0279 <0.01 <0.01
CEOMBA t 0.3458 0.0000 0.3789 0.0000 0.07
CEOAge t 55.8737 55.0000 56.4748 56.0000 0.03 <0.01
CEOTenure t 4.8835 2.9000 4.9216 3.1000 0.85 0.31
CEOTotBoards t 2.1191 2.0000 2.1248 2.0000 0.93 0.55
Proactive_Halt=1 Proactive_Halt=0 Test of Difference
(n= 697) (n= 141,058) (p-values)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
EventGoodNewsIndicator t 0.4334 0.0000 0.5147 1.0000 <0.01
CEOOpportunisticTrader t 0.5913 1.0000 0.5603 1.0000 0.26
CEORoutineTrader t 0.2198 0.0000 0.3088 0.0000 <0.01
ShortInterest t-1 0.0493 0.0238 0.0489 0.0280 0.92 0.03
CEOMBA t 0.3839 0.0000 0.3787 0.0000 0.85
CEOAge t 56.8731 56.0000 56.4710 56.0000 0.33 0.80
CEOTenure t 4.9353 2.4000 4.9214 3.1000 0.96 0.07
CEOTotBoards t 2.0433 1.0000 2.1249 2.0000 0.36 0.05
(p-values)(n= 141,431)(n= 323)
Reactive_Halt=1 Reactive_Halt=0 Test of Difference
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Table A3 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Multivariate logistic regressions 
 
 
 
  
Test (1) - (2) = 0
(3)
Pred Margin Margin p-value
Constituent Preference Variables
EventGoodNewsIndicator t (-) -0.0022 -5.68 *** -0.0006 -2.00 ** <0.01
CEOOpportunisticTrader t (-) -0.0015 -2.52 ** 0.0000 0.13 0.02
CEORoutineTrader t (-) -0.0011 -1.60 -0.0002 -0.44 0.10
ShortInterest t-1 (+) 0.0127 3.70 *** -0.0071 -2.48 ** <0.01
CEOMBA t (+/-) -0.0004 -0.90 0.0002 0.53 0.20
CEOAge t (+/-) 0.0000 -0.37 0.0000 2.16 ** 0.07
CEOTenure t (+/-) 0.0000 0.42 0.0000 0.97 0.98
CEOTotBoards t (+/-) 0.0001 0.31 0.0000 -0.31 0.53
Prior Quarter Control Variables
LnMVE t-1 0.0003 1.18 -0.0003 -1.86 *
Volume t-1 0.0017 1.01 0.0018 1.50
Volatility t-1 -0.0015 -0.10 0.0433 4.62 ***
LnNumAnalysts t-1 -0.0002 -0.57 -0.0004 -1.45
InstOwn t-1 0.0017 1.75 * 0.0025 3.34 ***
Event Window Controls
NYSE t -0.0029 -5.34 *** 0.0005 1.12
AbsEventRet t 0.0737 18.92 *** 0.0290 11.52 ***
MktHoursIndicator t 0.0012 2.09 ** 0.0004 0.97
I901_Indicator t 0.0017 3.04 *** 0.0002 0.43
I801_Indicator t 0.0039 7.00 *** 0.0013 3.28 ***
I701_Indicator t 0.0031 5.27 *** 0.0010 2.35 **
I202_Indicator t 0.0028 5.11 *** 0.0018 4.83 ***
I101_Indicator t 0.0032 4.12 *** -0.0001 -0.14
Fixed Effects
Psuedo R-Square
Area under ROC
N
0.804
137,846
Time, Industry
0.131 0.144
0.840
Time, Industry
132,176
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2)
z-stat z-stat
Proactive_Halt t Reactive_Halt t
57 
 
Table A4: Market consequences associated with unexplained discretion (8-K sample) 
This table provides details on the tests of market consequences associated with unexplained discretion, using the 8-K 
sample. Panel A provides multivariate logistic regressions to examine the association between small halt returns and 
the level of unexplained halt discretion. Panel B provides multivariate regressions to examine the association 
between post-halt stock return reversals and the level of unexplained halt discretion. We proxy for unexplained halt 
discretion using the residual (i.e., one minus the predicted probability) from a proactive halt model containing the 
control variables in Table A2; q(Residual) is the quartile (scaled between zero and one) of this residual; qN-Residual 
is a dummy variable set to one if the residual is in the Nth quartile. This analysis uses all proactive halts with 
available stock return data. Variables defined in Internet Appendix Variable Definitions following the tables. 
Regression marginal effects are calculated holding all other covariates at the sample mean. Standard errors are 
Huber/White robust estimators clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A: Small halt return tests 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Stock return reversal tests 
 
 
  
Margin Margin
Primary Variable(s)
q(Residual8k t ) 0.2355 7.47 ***
q2-Residual8k t 0.2390 3.17 ***
q3-Residual8k t 0.3285 4.13 ***
q4-Residual8k t 0.4594 5.45 ***
Psuedo R-Square
Area under ROC
N 758 758
0.090 0.097
0.710 0.710
z-stat z-stat
Dependent Variable: SmallHaltReturn t
(1) (2)
Coef. Coef.
Primary Variable(s)
HaltReturn t -0.0798 -2.04 **
q(Residual8k t ) x HaltReturn t -0.2151 -2.60 ***
q1-Residual8k t  x HaltReturn t -0.0574 -1.31
q2-Residual8k t  x HaltReturn t -0.2088 -3.93 ***
q3-Residual8k t  x HaltReturn t -0.3094 -4.30 ***
q4-Residual8k t  x HaltReturn t -0.1750 -2.87 ***
Control Variable(s)
PreHaltReturn t -0.0485 -0.74 -0.0325 -0.51
Adjusted R-Square
N
(1) (2)
t-stat t-stat
Dependent Variable: PostHaltReturn t
758 758
0.088 0.099
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Internet Appendix Variable Definitions 
Trading Halt Variables: 
 Halt = 1 if there is an individual stock trading halt, 0 otherwise. 
 Proactive_Halt = 1 if there is a proactive-individual stock trading halt, 0 otherwise. We 
define a halt as proactive if the 5-minute return immediately preceding 
the halt (calculated using midpoints of the bid-ask spread) is less than 5 
percent. 
 Reactive_Halt = 1 if there is a reactive-individual stock trading halt, 0 otherwise. We 
define a halt as reactive if the 5-minute return immediately preceding 
the halt (calculated using midpoints of the bid-ask spread) is greater 
than or equal to 5 percent. 
 
Independent Variables of Interest: 
 NYSE = 1 if the firm is listed on NYSE, 0 if the firm is listed on Nasdaq. 
 EventGoodNewsIndicator = 1 if the 2-day return beginning with the close prior to the 8-K 
acceptance time is positive, 0 otherwise. 
 CEORoutineTrader = 1 if the CEO’s trading is defined as routine, 0 if the trading is not 
defined as routine or the CEO does not trade during the 15-month 
period ending with the current quarter. Following Cohen, Malloy, and 
Pomorski (2012), we classify a CEO as a routine trader if she trades in 
the same direction (buy or sell) and the same month for three 
consecutive years. 
 CEOOpportunisticTrader = 1 if the CEO trades stock but does not meet the definition of 
CEORoutineTrader, 0 if CEORoutineTrader=1 or the CEO does not 
trade during the 15-month period ending with the current quarter. 
 CEOMBA = 1 if the CEO has an MBA (per BoardEx), 0 otherwise. 
 CEOAge = CEO age (per BoardEx). 
 CEOTenure = number of years the CEO has been in his position (per BoardEx).  
 CEOTotBoards = number of boards the CEO serves on for quoted firms (per BoardEx). 
 ShortInterest = Number of short sale positions in the company (as of the end of the 
prior quarter), scaled by the number of shares outstanding. 
Control Variables: 
 LnMVE = log (market value of equity as of the end of the prior quarter). 
 Volume = volume (in billions of shares) in the prior quarter. 
 Volatility = standard deviation of daily stock returns in the prior quarter. 
 LnNumAnalysts = log (1 + number of analysts following the firm in the prior quarter) 
 InstOwn = the proportion of shares (from 0 to 1) owned by institutional investors 
as of the end of the prior quarter, calculated using data from Thomson 
Reuters. 
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 AbsEventRet = the absolute value of the two-day return beginning with the close prior 
to the 8-K acceptance time.  
 MktHoursIndicator = 1 if the 8-K is accepted by the SEC within standard market hours 
(9:30a.m. – 4:00p.m. Eastern Time), 0 otherwise. 
 I901_Indicator = 1 if the 8-K includes topic I901 (Financial Statements and Exhibits), 0 
otherwise. 
 I801_Indicator = 1 if the 8-K includes topic I801 (Other Events), 0 otherwise. 
 I701_Indicator = 1 if the 8-K includes topic I701 (Regulation FD Disclosure), 0 
otherwise. 
 I202_Indicator = 1 if the 8-K includes topic I202 (Results of Operations and Financial 
Condition), 0 otherwise. 
 I101_Indicator = 1 if the 8-K includes topic I101 (Entry into a Material Definitive 
Agreement), 0 otherwise. 
  
 
Market Consequence Variables: 
We compute returns based on the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for halts with regular quotes. We 
exclude observations with spreads more than 100 percent of the midpoint in the window beginning 10-
minutes before the halt through 10-minutes after. 
 HaltReturn = The stock return over the halt period.  
 PreHaltReturn = The stock return in the 10-minutes preceding the halt.  
 PostHaltReturn = The stock return in the 10-minutes following the halt.  
 SmallHaltReturn = 1 if the HaltReturn is less than 50bp, 0 otherwise. 
 Residual8k = the portion of a proactive halt unexplained by firm information or 
fundamentals, calculated as the residual (i.e., one minus the predicted 
probability) from the 8-K logistic model for proactive halts including 
controls from Table A2. 
 
